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I. INTRODUCTION 
Under the guise of a health and safety rationale, a recent trend 
has seen individual states regulating aspects of agricultural 
production in a way that applies equally to products produced in 
state and out of state. These regulations, such as labelling laws and 
animal welfare restrictions, apply to products sold in the state 
enacting the regulation. But the regulations also have a much 
broader impact on the industry that extends beyond the borders of 
that state. 
The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine has long prohibited 
regulation that burdens interstate commerce. The history of 
dormant Commerce Clause litigation includes challenges to 
regulations regarding safety features on highway vehicles, species of 
fish, and produce packaging.1 In considering these regulations, 
courts weigh the incidental burden on interstate commerce against 
the local benefit. 
Both litigation, which ultimately uses the burden against benefit 
balancing test, and congressional action can resolve questions about 
the constitutionality of agricultural regulations under the 
Commerce Clause. Various state regulations prescribing laying hen 
cage sizes have provided some of the more recent opportunities for 
courts to conduct the balancing test; in one case, the Ninth Circuit 
dismissed a challenge to a California cage size law in November 
2016.2 In contrast, a Vermont “genetically modified organism” 
(“GMO”) labelling law was challenged through litigation,3 but 
Congress reached a nationwide solution.4 This national solution 
preempted Vermont’s state law and reduced the burden on 
manufacturers by creating a uniform national standard.5 Because of 
1. See infra Section II.A.3.
2. Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 847 F.3d 646, 656 (9th Cir. 2017), amending
and superseding 842 F.3d 658 (2016) (considering a challenge to CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 
3, § 1350(d)(1) and Assembly Bill 1437). 
3. See infra Section II.B.2.a.
4. See infra Section II.B.2.b.
5. See National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard, Pub. L. No.
114-216, 130 Stat. 834 (2016) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1639b) (preempting state 
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the difficulty and expense of litigating each instance individually, 
resolving the constitutionality of agricultural regulations through 
congressional action is superior to litigating state actions. Therefore, 
Congress should enact legislation prohibiting states from regulating 
agricultural production in a way that puts an excessive burden on 
interstate commerce; this could be accomplished either through a 
specific federal law for cage sizes that would preempt state laws or a 
more general federal law about state regulation of products in 
interstate commerce. 
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine 
1. The Commerce Clause
In a dual federalist system of government like the United States’, 
the federal government and state governments each have designated 
powers.6 Sometimes, federal and state areas of legislative power 
overlap.7 Such is the case with Congress’s interstate commerce 
power, which has been broadly construed and often conflicts with 
traditional state authority.8 
In general, Congress has only the powers enumerated in the 
U.S. Constitution, while the states retain non-enumerated powers 
that the states had prior to the Constitution’s existence.9 For 
food labeling standards that are not identical to the federal standard); VT. CODE R. 
§ 121 (2016) (regulating food labeling for genetically engineered foods); GE Food,
VT. ATT’Y GEN.’S OFF., http://ago.vermont.gov/hot-topics/ge-food-litigation.php 
(last visited Dec. 26, 2016) (discussing litigation challenging VT. CODE R. § 121 
(West, Westlaw through Jan. 13, 2017)).  
6. See, e.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 144 (2010). “The powers
‘delegated to the United States by the Constitution’ include those specifically 
enumerated powers listed in Article I along with the implementation authority 
granted by the Necessary and Proper Clause.” Id. (citation omitted). On the other 
hand, per the Tenth Amendment, “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.” Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. X). 
7. See, e.g., Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245, 252 (1829)
(considering whether the building of a dam on a marsh creek is within the State’s 
power over property, or whether the action conflicts with the federal power to 
regulate interstate waterways under the Commerce Clause). 
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. X.
3
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example, Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution gives 
Congress the power “[t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations, 
and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes,”10 while 
states retain traditional, non-enumerated police powers.11 The 
states’ traditional police powers include legislation on matters 
“detrimental to public health or morals, or the public safety 
generally. The power of the States to pass quarantine and inspection 
laws has never been questioned, and it includes that of prescribing 
the necessary regulations, as well as the subjects to which they may 
be applied.”12 
2. The Supremacy Clause
If the federal government and the state government both 
regulate in the same area and the laws conflict, the federal law 
prevails.13 Thus, under the Supremacy Clause, if Congress regulates 
in an area where it is authorized to do so by the Constitution, that 
act of regulation is said to preempt state and local regulation.14 Local 
regulations can also implicate the Supremacy Clause when they 
“would pass muster under the Due Process Clause, . . . [but] run 
afoul of the policy of free trade reflected in the Commerce Clause.”15 
3. The Dormant Commerce Clause
If Congress has not acted to exclude the states, states may 
regulate using their police power even if Congress has the power to 
regulate in the same area,16 unless doing so would violate the 
10. Id. art. I, § 8.
11. Hannibal & St. J.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 467 (1877) (“Whilst the
power to regulate commerce is granted to Congress, that of establishing interior 
police regulations belongs to the States.”). 
12. Id. at 468 (citations omitted) (quoting Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington
Ry., 27 Vt. 140 (1854)). 
13. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
14. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 41 (1824) (“Each party possessing the power,
may of course use it. Each being sovereign as to the power, may use it in any form, 
and in relation to any subject; and to guard against a conflict in practice, the law of 
Congress is made supreme.”). 
15. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529 (1959) (citations
omitted). 
16. Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245, 252 (1829) (“If
Congress had passed any act which bore upon the case; any act in execution of the 
power to regulate commerce, the object of which was to control state legislation 
over those small navigable creeks into which the tide flows . . . we should feel not 
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dormant Commerce Clause.17 The dormant Commerce Clause is not 
an actual clause in the Constitution but has been inferred from the 
Commerce Clause and developed in case law.18 As stated in Willson 
v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., the dormant Commerce Clause may be
violated where a state regulation is “repugnant to [Congress’s] 
power to regulate commerce in its dormant state.”19 In other words, 
even where Congress has not acted, if Congress could regulate an 
area of commerce, a state regulation in that area may be invalid even 
though there is no direct conflict with federal law.20 Where state and 
local laws put an undue burden on interstate commerce, they violate 
the dormant Commerce Clause.21 
The Supreme Court identifies two types of state statutes that 
improperly regulate interstate commerce: (1) “statutes that burden 
interstate transactions only incidentally,” and (2) statutes that 
“affirmatively discriminate” against interstate transactions.22 To 
determine whether state statutes affecting interstate commerce are 
valid, the general rule is: “Where the statute regulates even-handedly 
to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on 
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the 
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to 
the putative local benefits.”23 
A state regulation with the clear intent on the face of the statute 
to discriminate against out-of-state interests “invokes the strictest 
much difficulty in saying that a state law coming in conflict with such act would be 
void. But Congress has passed no such act.”). 
17. Id. (“The repugnancy of the law of Delaware to the Constitution is placed
entirely on its repugnancy to the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations 
and among the several states; a power which has not been so exercised as to affect 
the question. We do not think that the act empowering the Black Bird Creek Marsh 
Company to place a dam across the creek, can, under all the circumstances of the 
case, be considered as repugnant to the power to regulate commerce in its dormant 
state, or as being in conflict with any law passed on the subject.”). 
18. See id.
19. Id. (alteration in original).
20. See id.
21. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
22. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986).
23. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,
362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)) (“The basic limitations upon local legislative power in this 
area are clear enough. The controlling principles have been reiterated over the 
years in a host of this Court’s decisions. Evenhanded local regulation to effectuate 
a legitimate local public interest is valid unless pre-empted by federal action . . . or 
unduly burdensome on . . . interstate commerce . . . .”). 
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scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose.”24 Where the 
state regulation does not have a stated discriminatory purpose, but 
it uses discriminatory means, it will be subject to strict scrutiny 
review.25 
The Court has often invalidated regulations that do not 
technically discriminate against out-of-state interests but 
nevertheless unduly burden interstate commerce. For example, in 
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., an Arizona state law placed an undue 
burden on interstate commerce by requiring cantaloupes grown in 
Arizona to be processed in Arizona in order to be labeled as Arizona 
cantaloupes.26 The company challenging the law grew cantaloupes 
in Arizona but had a cantaloupe packaging plant across the border 
in California.27 The company would have needed to spend at least 
$200,000 to comply with the act by building a second packaging 
plant in Arizona.28 This state law placed an undue burden on 
interstate commerce.29 The interest in labeling premium 
cantaloupes grown in Arizona was a legitimate local purpose, but 
forcing the packing company to build a second packaging plant had 
Commerce Clause implications that outweighed the local benefit.30 
Also invalidating a regulation, but on the basis that there 
essentially was no valid local purpose, the Court in Raymond Motor 
Transportation, Inc. v. Rice invalidated a Wisconsin statute31 that 
prohibited trucks longer than fifty-five feet from being operated on 
state highways without a permit.32 The challenged regulations 
“[made] no more than the most speculative contribution to highway 
safety.”33 The Court took notice of the “great number of exceptions” 
to the rule, “especially those that discriminate[d] in favor of local 
24. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979).
25. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 139; see City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617,
617 (1978) (“The crucial inquiry here must be directed to determining whether 
[the regulation] is basically an economic protectionist measure, and thus virtually 
per se invalid, or a law directed at legitimate local concerns that has only incidental 
effects on interstate commerce.”). 
26. Pike, 397 U.S. at 146.
27. Id. at 139.
28. Id. at 140.
29. Id. at 146.
30. Id.
31. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 447–48 (1978).
32. Id. at 432.
33. Id. at 429.
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industry.”34 The exceptions undermined the assumption that “the 
State’s own political processes [would] act as a check on local 
regulations that unduly burden interstate commerce.”35 
In Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., another case implicating the 
balancing test, an Illinois law required trucks and trailers on the 
state’s highways to be equipped with a unique type of curved 
mudguard that was not common in the industry.36 The state argued 
that the mudguard promoted safety by protecting motorists driving 
behind the trucks from being hit with mud or debris.37 The Court 
observed that a unique law could have a local benefit significant 
enough to outweigh the burden on interstate commerce: 
[a] State which insists on a design out of line with the 
requirements of almost all the other States may sometimes 
place a great burden of delay and inconvenience on those 
interstate motor carriers entering or crossing its territory. 
Such a new safety device—out of line with the requirements 
of other States—may be so compelling that the innovating 
State need not be the one to give way.38 
But the Court determined that the claimed benefit of this new 
technology when balanced against the clear burden on commerce 
was “far too inconclusive to make this mudguard meet that test.”39 
Maine v. Taylor is one of the rare cases in which the legitimate 
local purpose for a statute was found to outweigh the statute’s 
burden on interstate commerce.40 In that case, the state of Maine 
prohibited importing live baitfish.41 The purpose of the regulation 
was to protect Maine’s fish population from harmful non-native, 
invasive species.42 Standardized techniques for inspection of baitfish 
34. Id.
35. Id. at 447.
36. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529–30 (1959).
37. See id. at 521 n.1.
38. Id. at 529–30.
39. Id. at 530.
40. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 131 (1986).
41. See id. at 132.
42. See id. at 140–41 (“First, Maine’s population of wild fish—including its own
indigenous golden shiners—would be placed at risk by three types of parasites 
prevalent in out-of-state baitfish, but not common to wild fish in Maine. Second, 
nonnative species inadvertently included in shipments of live baitfish could disturb 
Maine’s aquatic ecology to an unpredictable extent by competing with native fish 
for food or habitat, by preying on native species, or by disrupting the environment 
in more subtle ways.” (citations omitted)). 
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did not exist at the time.43 The Court applied strict scrutiny and 
found in favor of the statute44 because the evidence in that case 
amply “support[ed] the District Court’s findings that Maine’s ban on 
the importation of live baitfish serv[ed] legitimate local purposes 
that could not adequately be served by available nondiscriminatory 
alternatives.”45 
B. Recent Agricultural Litigation Regulating Interstate Commerce 
One of the more recent areas of regulation to potentially run 
afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause is regulation of agricultural 
production and processing. States may find these regulations subject 
to challenge as they impose burdens across the United States. 
Litigation over laying hen cage sizes, which have been the subject of 
different requirements in different states, has demonstrated the 
problem with these individual state regulations. In contrast, uniform 
national regulation can be less burdensome than (often conflicting) 
individual state regulations. Although no federal solution has been 
made in the egg laying industry, the GMO labelling law passed by 
Congress in 2016 provides an example of how a national regulation 
can provide the solution to patchwork regulation.
1. Regulations of Cage Sizes for Egg-Laying Hens
At least two jurisdictions have enacted regulation of hen cage 
sizes for hens laying eggs to be sold in that jurisdiction, each with 
differing requirements.46 This creates a salmagundi of standards for 
egg producers, who often sell eggs across the United States, to sort 
through. A California law was enacted and survived a challenge that 
went to the Ninth Circuit; the case was dismissed primarily on 
standing grounds.47 A Massachusetts law, one of the broadest 
regulations of its type, that regulates hen cage sizes under an animal 
cruelty rationale, has yet to face a challenge in court.48 These 
regulations demonstrate the inherent problems with local 
regulations that infringe on interstate commerce. 
43. See id. at 146.
44. Id. at 151–52.
45. Id. at 151.
46. See infra Section II.B.1.a, b.
47. See infra Section II.B.1.a.
48. See infra Section II.B.1.b.
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a. California’s Proposition 2
A recent California ballot initiative provides a stellar example of 
legislation challenged as too restrictive on agricultural commerce.49 
In 2008, California voters approved a ballot initiative called 
Proposition 2 that, starting January 1, 2015, made it illegal in 
California to “tether or confine any covered animal [including egg-
laying hens], on a farm, for all or the majority of any day, in a manner 
that prevents such animal from (a) Lying down, standing up, and 
fully extending his or her limbs; and (b) Turning around freely.”50 
Compliance requires a minimum of 116 square inches of floor space 
per bird.51 
In March 2014, after California passed Proposition 2 and 
drafted laws in accordance with the proposition, the states of 
Missouri, Iowa, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Kentucky, and Alabama 
brought suit against the new California laws, specifically the 
provisions governing the sale of “shell eggs.”52 Among other things, 
the regulation requires producers to enclose hens that lay eggs 
ultimately sold in California in cages that meet certain size 
requirements.53 The states alleged that the new laws, Assembly Bill 
1437 (“AB 1437”) and Proposition 2, which became CDFA Shell Egg 
Food Safety regulation 1350(d), collectively referred to as the “Shell 
Egg Laws,” placed an unconstitutional burden on interstate 
commerce.54 CDFA Shell Egg Food Safety regulation 1350(d), 
enacted in 2013 and effective in 2015, applies to California egg 
producers. Subsequently, AB 1437 was specifically enacted to protect 
California egg producers required to comply with Proposition 2 
from competition with out-of-state egg producers.55 The law subject 
to dormant Commerce Clause challenge, therefore, is AB 1437, 
49. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 3, § 1350 (West, Westlaw through Jan. 13, 2017)
[hereinafter CDFA Shell Egg Food Safety regulation 1350(d)]; Brief for Appellants 
at 2, Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 842 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 14-17111) 
[hereinafter Appellants’ Brief]. 
50. Appellant’s Brief at 6.
51. See id. at 14 (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 3, § 1350(d)(1) (West, Westlaw
through Jan. 13, 2017)). 
52. Id. at 3.
53. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 3, § 1350(d) (“Commencing January 1, 2015, no egg
handler or producer may sell or contract to sell a shelled egg for human 
consumption in California if it is the product of an egg-laying hen that was confined 
in an enclosure that fails to comply with [certain] standards.”). 
54. Appellant’s Brief at 15.
55. See id. at 12:22.
9
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because it is the one that applies the cage size requirements to eggs 
sold in California produced by hens outside of California. 
The challenge was dismissed for the state plaintiffs lack of 
standing to sue on behalf of their residents.56 The court found that 
the suit was really on behalf of a few producers who might be affected 
by the California regulation,57 which is not sufficient to confer 
standing to the state.58 The court did not reach the merits of the 
case.59 
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the Appellant States challenged 
the rulings on standing, ripeness, and whether the district court’s 
dismissal of the complaint without leave to amend was an abuse of 
discretion.60 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district 
court.61 The Ninth Circuit held that the parties challenging the law 
lacked standing; the egg producers themselves, not the states, should 
bring suit if they want to challenge the California law.62 
b. Massachusetts Farm Animal Cruelty Act
On November 8, 2016, Massachusetts passed the Massachusetts 
Farm Animal Cruelty Act, one of the country’s broadest regulations 
regarding the sale of eggs and meat from confined animals.63 Its 
stated purpose is to “prevent animal cruelty by phasing out extreme 
methods of farm animal confinement, which also threaten the 
health and safety of Massachusetts consumers, increase the risk of 
foodborne illness, and have negative fiscal impacts on the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts[,]” arguably a health and safety 
rationale.64 The regulation makes it unlawful for a farm owner 
“within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to knowingly cause any 
covered animal to be confined in a cruel manner.”65 This law 
56. Missouri v. Harris, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1075 (E.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d and
remanded sub nom. Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 842 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2016), 
withdrawn from bound volume, and aff’d and remanded, 847 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2017). 
57. Id. at 1072–73.
58. Id. at 1073.
59. See id.
60. See Appellants’ Brief, supra note 49, at 2.
61. See Harris, 847 F.3d at 650.
62. Id. at 664.
63. See MASS. GEN LAWS. ANN. ch. 129 app. at § 1-1 (West, Westlaw Current
through Chapter 20 of the 2017 1st Annual Session). 
64. See id.
65. Id. § 1-2.
10
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prohibits cruel confinement of not only egg-laying hens but also 
breeding pigs and calves raised for veal.66 
The statute defines “confined in a cruel manner” as that which 
“prevent[s] a covered animal from lying down, standing up, fully 
extending the animal’s limbs, or turning around freely.”67 The 
regulation also prevents business owners from knowingly selling 
pork, veal, or eggs from animals unlawfully confined, even if the 
source is outside of Massachusetts.68 Under the statute, a laying hen 
must have at least 1.5 square feet of usable floor space to be 
considered able to fully extend its limbs.69 The rules and regulations 
implementing the Act must be in place by January 1, 2020, and the 
Act will take effect two years later on January 1, 2022.70 This 
regulation illustrates the continuing patchwork of laws producers 
will face when attempting to comply with cage size and other 
restrictions in producing eggs. There is no indication that the Act 
has been challenged yet in litigation; however, litigation on dormant 
Commerce Clause grounds may be forthcoming if a national federal 
solution is not reached. 
2. Vermont GMO Labelling Law
Litigation in multiple states to challenge varying standards does 
not need to be the outcome of the hen cage size dispute. Instead, a 
uniform federal law could be passed to set a national standard, as 
occurred in a recent dispute regarding a GMO labeling statute in 
Vermont. The state of Vermont enacted Act 120, which took effect 
on July 1, 2016.71 Act 120 required retailers to label food produced 
with genetic engineering as either entirely or partially produced 
from genetic engineering.72 
a. Dormant Commerce Clause Litigation
In response to the Vermont GMO law, several associations 
brought a federal court challenge for declaratory and injunctive 
66. Id. § 1-5(D).
67. Id. § 1-5(E).
68. See id. § 1-3.
69. Id. § 1-5(J).
70. See id. §§ 1-10, 1-11.
71. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 3041–3048 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.
and 2016 Special Sess.). 
72. Id. § 3043.
11
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relief.73 The Complaint alleged several claims, including First 
Amendment free speech violations,74 violations of the Due Process 
Clause,75 violations of the Commerce Clause,76 and violations of the 
Supremacy Clause.77 
In its Commerce Clause claim, the associations alleged that Act 
120 required manufacturers to label their products in specific ways 
and placed advertising restrictions on products in Vermont.78 The 
Complaint further alleged that: 
The vast majority of Plaintiffs’ members are manufacturers 
located outside the State of Vermont. There are no major 
food manufacturers based in Vermont, and Vermont’s 
restaurant and dairy industries, as well as its organic 
industry, are all exempted from the Act’s requirements. 
Consequently, the cost of implementing the regulation 
falls largely, if not entirely, on out-of-state companies.79 
The Complaint described the burden as follows: 
Plaintiffs’ members sell food in interstate commerce 
through nationwide and regional distribution chains. In 
order to comply with the Act, they would need to establish 
Vermont-specific distribution channels where those 
channels do not currently exist. However, there is no 
commercially reasonable way to do so, and it may be 
impossible to establish such a system before the Act’s 
effective date. Therefore, to avoid liability under Act 120, 
manufacturers who do not or cannot establish Vermont-
specific distribution would have to revise their labeling on 
a regional or even nationwide basis, no matter where in the 
country their products may ultimately be sold.80  
After the district court judge denied an injunction, the 
associations appealed the denial to the Second Circuit.81 However, 
after Public Law 114-216, the federal GMO labelling law, was 
73. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 1, Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v.
Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583 (D. Vt. 2015) (No. 5:14-CV-117), 2014 WL 2965321. 
74. Id. at 13, 17.
75. Id. at 18.
76. Id. at 20.
77. Id. at 21.
78. Id. at 18.
79. Id. at 18.
80. Id. at 18–19.
81. See Scott K.G. Kozak, Vermont GMO Battle Continues in Second Circuit, NAT’L
L. REV. (Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/vermont-gmo-battle 
-continues-second-circuit.  
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enacted,82 Vermont’s Attorney General announced that Vermont 
would no longer enforce Act 120,83 presumably because it was 
preempted by the federal law. The parties then reached an 
agreement to dismiss the case, which was essentially mooted by the 
state’s announcement that it would not enforce Act 120.84 
b. Enacted Federal Regulation: Public Law 114-216
Ultimately, the GMO labelling issue was not resolved through 
litigation: Congress reached a federal legislative solution to the 
problem caused by the Vermont GMO law. Public Law No. 114-216 
requires the FDA to establish a national mandatory bioengineered 
food disclosure standard.85 The law prevents individual states from 
regulating GMO food labeling.86 Instead, food may bear a disclosure 
that the food is bioengineered only in accordance with regulations 
promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture, in accordance with the 
law.87 This federal law was a compromise, but the industry ultimately 
supported it because it nullified the Vermont law.88 Now, rather than 
causing the packaging industry to deal with a patchwork of 
inconsistent laws, complying with the single uniform federal law will 
be less of a burden on industry actors. 
III. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION IS NEEDED TO AVOID INCREASED
LITIGATION 
A. Constitutionality of Regulation of Cage Sizes for Egg-Laying Hens 
On the issue of laying hen cage sizes, a federal legislative 
solution has not been reached, and the line between state police 
power and the dormant Commerce Clause continues to be litigated. 
82. National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard, Pub. L. No. 114-216,
130 Stat. 834 (2016); see also infra Section II.B.2.b. 
83. See Robert Audette, Parties in Vermont GMO Labeling Lawsuit Agree to
Dismissal, VTDIGGER (Sept. 2, 2016, 11:34 AM), https://vtdigger.org 
/2016/09/02/parties-vermont-gmo-labeling-lawsuit-agree-dismissal/. 
84. Id.
85. 130 Stat. 834.
86. Id. § 295(b).
87. Id. § 293(b)(2)(D).
88. See Dan Charles, Congress Just Passed a GMO Labeling Bill. Nobody’s Super
Happy About It, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 14, 2016, 5:34 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/07/14/486060866/congress-just      
-passed-a-gmo-labeling-bill-nobodys-super-happy-about-it. 
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The regulations in California and Massachusetts likely violate the 
dormant Commerce Clause by regulating conduct outside their 
borders. The California regulations likely have a discriminatory 
purpose and would be invalidated on strict scrutiny review. Even if 
the purpose was not found to be discriminatory and the law was 
determined to have only incidental effects on interstate commerce, 
the burden of each law in California and Massachusetts outweighs 
the minor value of the legitimate local purpose. 
1. State Regulation with a Discriminatory Means
Where a state regulation does not have a stated discriminatory 
purpose but uses discriminatory means, it will be subject to strict 
scrutiny review.89 The California regulations should be evaluated 
under the discriminatory means test, and strict scrutiny should be 
applied. As the Appellants in Missouri v. Harris pointed out, the 
California regulations are problematic because they are actually two 
different regulations.90 Proposition 2, now codified, applies to in-
state producers.91 AB 1437 applies to out-of-state producers.92 The 
rationale of Proposition 2 is at least arguably related to health and 
safety93 because some evidence suggests that requiring hens to live 
in cages larger than the traditional sixty-seven square-inch “battery 
cages” can reduce exposure to disease pathogens, such as 
salmonella.94 
89. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (quoting Lacoste v.
Louisiana Dep’t of Conservation, 263 U.S. 545, 550 (1924)) (“[W]hen considering 
the purpose of a challenged statute, this Court is not bound by ‘[t]he name, 
description or characterization given it by the legislature or the courts of the State,’ 
but will determine for itself the practical impact of the law.”). This is true even 
though the Ninth Circuit found the law was not discriminatory for purposes of 
parens patriae standing. Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 847 F.3d 646, 655 (9th Cir. 
2017) (quoting Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 
F.3d 937, 948 (9th Cir. 2013)) (“The Shell Egg Laws do not distinguish among eggs 
based on their state of origin. A statute that treats ‘both intrastate and interstate 
products’ alike ‘is not discriminatory.’”). 
90. See Appellants’ Brief, supra note 49, at 13–14 (discussing Phase I and II).
91. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25990 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg.
Sess.); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 3, § 1350(d) (West, Westlaw through Jan. 13, 2017). 
92. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 25996.
93. Sarah McNabb, California’s Proposition 2 Has Egg Producers Scrambling: Is It
Constitutional?, 23 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 159, 176 (2014). 
94. See Calvin Massey, The California Egg Law and the Dormant Commerce Clause,
THE FAC. LOUNGE (Mar. 13, 2014, 2:51 PM), http://www.thefacultylounge.org 
/2014/03/the-california-egg-law-and-the-dormant-commerce-clause.html. 
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The rationale of AB 1437, however, is economic protectionism. 
After Proposition 2 was passed, there was concern that California’s 
over three hundred million dollar egg industry would be at a 
competitive disadvantage to out-of-state egg producers.95 If 
California could no longer use the small “battery” cages but was 
required to use larger “colony” cages (or to go cage-free), the cost of 
production would increase for California producers, and they would 
have to raise the cost of eggs as sold to consumers, while out-of-state 
egg producers could keep their prices lower. In his signing 
statement, Governor Schwarzenegger stated, “By ensuring that all 
eggs sold in California meet the requirements of Proposition 2, this 
bill is good for both California egg producers and animal welfare.”96 Not 
only do the two statutes have different rationales, but they may have 
different applicable standards. 97 It is not clear whether AB 1437 
incorporates the same colony cage standards of Proposition 2 or 
requires out-of-state producers to go entirely cage-free.98 California 
is using discriminatory means to protect in-state interests, and a 
court evaluating the constitutionality of AB 1437 should apply strict 
scrutiny. 
In applying strict scrutiny review, the Supreme Court has stated 
that “[t]he crucial inquiry here must be directed to determining 
whether [the regulation] is basically an economic protectionist 
measure, and thus virtually per se invalid, or a law directed at 
legitimate local concerns that has only incidental effects on 
interstate commerce.”99 AB 1437 was passed after Proposition 2. It 
was passed in response to public concern that the massive California 
egg industry might be wiped out by out-of-state competition after 
Proposition 2 went into effect.100 It is evident that at least one 
95. Wyatt Buchanan, Law Extends State’s Egg Mandates to Imports, SFGATE, July
7, 2010, http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Law-extends-state-s-egg-mandates 
-to-imports-3182388.php. 
96. Susan Ferriss, Schwarzenegger Signs Bill Requiring “Humane” Out-of-State Eggs,
THE SACRAMENTO BEE (July 7, 2010) (emphasis added), https://charleslincoln3.files 
.wordpress.com/2014/02/missouri-v-harris-exhibit-n-22schwarzenegger-signs-bill    
-requiring-22humane22-out-of-state-eggs22-2-14cv00341_docketentry_02-03-2014_2 
-14.pdf. 
97. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 49, at 14.
98. See id. at ER46–ER47.
99. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 617 (1978) (citing Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). 
100.  Buchanan, supra note 95. 
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motivation behind the enactment of AB 1437 is economic 
protectionism.101 Thus, it should be invalid.102 
While the Ninth Circuit dismissed the case on standing grounds, 
if the case were brought by the proper plaintiffs, it should not be 
dismissed. There is not a legitimate local purpose that outweighs the 
burden on interstate commerce. The California cage-hen case is 
distinguishable from Maine v. Taylor, in which the Court found that 
Maine’s prohibition on the importation of live baitfish was valid, 
because protecting its fish population from harmful non-native 
species was a legitimate local concern.103 Here, protecting laying 
hens from a marginally higher risk of salmonella is not a legitimate 
local concern (or at least it is a concern that does not weigh heavily), 
and there are other ways of reducing the risk of salmonella than 
requiring out-of-state producers to house hens in larger cages. 
2. Even-Handed Regulation with Incidental Effects on State
Commerce
Even if considered even-handed regulations with incidental 
effects on interstate commerce and therefore evaluated under the 
lower standard of review, both the California regulations and the 
Massachusetts regulation should be invalidated because they place 
an undue burden on interstate commerce.104 
a. California’s AB 1437
No matter how AB 1437 is applied, it will place an undue burden 
on egg producers by making production significantly more 
expensive. Some estimates show that if applied coextensively with 
Proposition 2, the cost of producing eggs could rise at least twelve 
percent.105 If producers are required to implement cage-free 
production, the production costs could increase by more than thirty-
101.  See, e.g., Ferriss, supra note 96. 
 102.  See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (finding “conservation” 
to be an illegitimate local state interest “when equally effective nondiscriminatory 
conservation measures are available”). 
103.  Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 131 (1986). 
104.  See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (“Where the statute regulates even-handedly to 
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce 
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce 
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”). 
105.  Appellants’ Brief, supra note 49, at 14. 
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four percent.106 When these serious burdens are weighed against the 
marginal benefit of reducing the possibility of salmonella, this 
regulation violates the dormant Commerce Clause. 
In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., the Arizona state law requiring 
Arizona cantaloupes to be processed in Arizona so that they could 
be labeled as Arizona cantaloupes placed an undue burden on 
interstate commerce because the company would have needed to 
build a second packaging plant when there was already one built 
across the border in a neighboring state.107 Similarly, here, 
producers will need to build different, additional, or duplicative 
cages in order to comply with the California regulations. This is 
unduly burdensome. 
b. Massachusetts’ Prevention of Farm Animal Cruelty Act
The Massachusetts law violates the dormant Commerce Clause 
for the same reasons. Moreover, the Massachusetts law demonstrates 
the difficulty egg producers will face not only with attempting to 
comply with one law but with a patchwork of burdensome laws. They 
will have to build different cages to comply with different state and 
local laws.108 They will also need to segregate which eggs go to which 
states to comply with those laws. This represents an undue burden 
on interstate commerce, and the laws should be struck down as 
inconsistent with the dormant Commerce Clause. 
B. Congress Should Pass a Uniform Federal Law Nullifying State Laws 
Congress should offer a solution that prohibits states from 
enacting laws setting specific cage sizes for out-of-state producers. 
This will create fairness among egg producers and avoid the expense 
and burden of attempting to comply with a patchwork of state laws 
with different requirements for cage sizes. The GMO labeling bill 
compromise was reached because Congress determined that a 
uniform federal law would avoid placing an undue burden on 
industry in needing to comply with various labeling requirements, 
including those of Vermont.109 The same is true in the context of the 
106.  Id.  
107.  Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
108.  See, e.g., 2016 Mass. Acts 333, §§ 5(E), 5(J) (West, Westlaw through Nov. 8, 
2016) (requiring that a laying hen must have at least 1.5 square feet of usable floor 
space to be considered able to fully extend its limbs). 
109.  See generally Charles, supra note 88. 
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laying-hen cage-size controversy. The recent Ninth Circuit 
affirmance demonstrates that industry will continue to bear the 
burden of enforcing the dormant Commerce Clause if Congress 
does not act.110 
Iowa Representative Steve King previously attempted to prohibit 
states from making such regulations by introducing the so-called 
King Amendment in the Agricultural Act of 2014.111 The 
amendment was not included in the final version of the bill.112 Critics 
of the amendment were concerned that it would have the 
unintended consequence of invalidating a number of constitutional 
state health and safety laws.113 Proponents of the amendment were 
concerned about the negating the effects of the California law on 
egg producers in Iowa and other states.114 
The proposed King Amendment stated, “[c]onsistent with 
Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution of the United States, 
the government of a State or locality therein shall not impose a 
standard or condition on the production or manufacture of any 
agricultural product sold or offered for sale in interstate commerce” 
under certain circumstances.115 The circumstances included were: 
(1) such production or manufacture occurs in another 
State; and 
(2) the standard or condition is in addition to the 
standards and conditions applicable to such production or 
manufacture pursuant to— 
(A) Federal law; and 
(B) the laws of the State and locality in which such 
production or manufacture occurs.116 
This proposed language is consistent with the dormant 
Commerce Clause.117 It would reduce the burden placed on egg 
producers, some of whom may otherwise be required to comply with 
both the California and Massachusetts laws, and possibly others.118 
110.  See Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 847 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2017).  
111.  See H.R. 687, 113th Cong. (2013). 
112.  Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, 128 Stat. 649 (2014). 
113.  See Iowa Rep. Steve King Lays an Egg on the Farm Bill, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2014, 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-king-amendment-farm-bill 
-20140123-story.html. 
114.  See id. 
115.  H.R. 687. 
116.  Id. 
117.  See generally supra Section II.A. 
118.  Compare 2016 Mass. Acts 333, § 5(E) (West, Westlaw through Nov. 8, 2016) 
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The King Amendment is just one example of a national 
legislative solution to the current problem. A revised version of the 
King Amendment could be passed with a clarification to address 
some of the concerns about unintended preemption of state health 
and safety laws. Alternatively, as with the GMO labelling law, 
Congress could pass a law setting a uniform cage size for laying hens. 
In any case, a uniform federal standard would be the most efficient 
solution to avoid unnecessary litigation and the burden of 
compliance with multiple conflicting state standards. 
IV. CONCLUSION
With an increasing interest in animal welfare and food 
traceability from the American public, it is likely that dormant 
Commerce Clause litigation in the agricultural production industry 
will only intensify. While only two states currently have regulations 
regarding cage sizes for laying hens that cross state lines, the industry 
is already feeling the burden of increased and conflicting standards 
for production. As additional states consider or pass legislation, it 
will only make it more imperative that a national consensus is 
reached on this issue. Because of the difficulty and expense of 
litigating each instance individually, Congress should act. Congress 
should either use the recent GMO labelling law as inspiration to 
resolve these issues by setting a national standard or enact legislation 
consistent with the dormant Commerce Clause prohibiting states 
from regulating agricultural production in a way that puts an 
excessive burden on interstate commerce. 
(requiring that a laying hen must have at least 1.5 square feet, or 216 square inches, 
of usable floor space to be considered able to fully extend its limbs), with CAL. CODE 
REGS. tit. 3, § 1350(d)(1) (West, Westlaw through Jan. 13, 2017) (requiring 116 
inches of floor space per bird). 
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